Thursday, October 14, 2010

美中陷入人民币僵局US and China: Two giants locked in a symbiotic embrace

Sometimes it seems this stand-off has been going on for ever. Through economic upturns and downturns, through financial crisis and recovery, the world’s two dominant economies have remained locked in the same dysfunctional yet symbiotic embrace.

有时我感觉,目前这种僵局就从未被打破过。无论经济是起是落,是金融危机还是复苏,世界上两大主导经济体之间总是维持着同一种失常、但又互利共生的关系。

China, through huge purchases of dollars to stop its currency rising, is in essence lending the US money to buy Chinese exports. The US complains vociferously, but still either its consumers or its government keeps borrowing.

中国通过大量购买美元来阻止人民币升值,实际上是借钱给美国来购买中国出口商品。尽管美国高声抗议,但上至政府、下至普通消费者,都仍在继续借债。

The US current account deficit did fall somewhat during the crisis, as lower domestic demand in the US stopped sucking in quite so many imports. But as the economic freeze thaws, it becomes clear that the structures underneath remain unchanged, and the Chinese trade surplus has risen again.

危机期间,由于国内需求下降,吸纳不了太多的进口商品,美国经常账户赤字的确减少了一些。但随着经济解冻,情况已变得明朗:根本结构仍保持不变,中国的贸易顺差再次增加。

The ground on which this fixture is fought out is the Chinese exchange rate. Earlier this year, there was an apparent breakthrough. Through a combination of threats (mainly from Congress) and quiet diplomacy (mainly from the Barack Obama administration) the US convinced Beijing to unpeg the renminbi from the dollar, to which it had been fixed since 2008.

美中两国陷入这种固定模式的根源就是人民币汇率问题。今年早些时候,情况看似出现了转机。通过威胁(主要来自美国国会)和秘密外交(主要来自巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)政府)双管齐下,美国说服中国政府放弃了2008年恢复的人民币盯住美元政策。

China timed its announcement about this for shortly before the meeting of the G20 heads of government in Toronto this June, a gathering that the renminbi issue had threatened to overshadow.

中国将宣布这一决定的时间选在了今年6月份20国集团(G20)多伦多峰会召开前夕——此前人们担心,人民币问题可能会为该会议蒙上阴影。

But anyone who thought that would be an end to the matter was mistaken. Having loosened the moorings that kept the renminbi anchored to the dollar, Beijing nonetheless continued to keep it on a short tether. In the three months after the unpegging, the Chinese currency rose less than 1 per cent against the dollar. Having initially said that the US was not setting a target for how much it wanted the currency to rise, Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, was nonetheless keen to point out that it needed to rise faster than that.

但有谁以为该问题将就此告一段落就错了。自宣布人民币与美元脱钩以来,北京方面仍把人民币与美元较紧密的捆绑在一起。脱钩3个月后,人民币对美元升幅仍不足1%。尽管美国财长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)一开始曾表示,美国不会为人民币升值幅度设定一个心理目标,但他仍热切地指出,人民币应加快升值步伐。

Meanwhile, Congress, blaming China and the exchange rate for many of the woes of the US economy, was reaching the end of its own tether. Congressmen and senators have threatened for years to legislate to punish China for currency manipulation, though it has never been clear how serious they are and how much this is a bad cop act to complement the good cop role being played by the administration.

与此同时,将美国经济诸多问题都归咎于中国和人民币汇率的美国国会,也几乎智穷才尽。多年来,众议员和参议员们一直威胁要通过立法来惩罚中国操纵汇率。不过,他们从未说清楚自己到底有多严肃,以及这在多大程度上属于唱白脸,以衬托奥巴马政府所唱的红脸。

In any case, it appeared that the Obama administration, in the face of rising discontent over the economy and high unemployment, was increasingly reluctant to stand between an angry Congress and an implacable Beijing. Mr Geithner’s tone became less emollient as time went on. And as the various plans for legislation were refined to make them more precise and less likely to be struck down by a legal challenge at the World Trade Organisation, the administration studiously avoided explicitly opposing them.

无论如何,随着民众对经济状况和失业率高企的不满情绪渐增,奥巴马政府似乎越来越不愿在愤怒的国会和难以安抚的中国政府之间周旋。盖特纳的语气也变得越来越不和缓。议员们修订了各种立法草案,以求其更加精准、更不容易在世贸组织(WTO)受到法律挑战而遭推翻,奥巴马政府则刻意避免明确反对这些草案。

A week before the world’s finance ministers were due to gather in Washington for the International Monetary Fund meetings that begin on Friday, the House of Representatives acted, passing a law that would allow the US to use estimates of currency undervaluation to calculate so-called “countervailing duties” against imports deemed to be unfairly subsidised.

上周五,各国财长齐集华盛顿,出席国际货币基金组织(IMF)会议。美国众议院在此前一周采取行动,通过了一部法案,允许美国政府在针对据信获得不公平补贴的进口商品计算所谓“反补贴关税”时,使用估计的汇率低估幅度。

Charles Schumer, the Democratic senator from New York who has been banging the drum for currency legislation for a long time, has threatened to push his own version through the Senate in the “lame-duck” session between November’s midterm elections and the new Congress taking its seats in January.

长期以来一直鼓吹对汇率立法的纽约州民主党参议员查尔斯•舒默(Charles Schumer),已威胁在11月中期选举至明年1月新议员到位之间的“跛脚鸭”会期,推动参议院通过他的提案。

It remains to be seen whether the Senate wants to take that course, or whether these threats to legislate are all part of an elaborate theatre designed to persuade China to co-operate. But whatever the underlying motive, it does seem that the forces in Washington opposing legislation are weakening.

人们仍看不透,参议院是真想这么做,还是说这些立法威胁只不过是一出精心安排的、旨在说服中国合作的大戏。但无论潜在动机是什么,华盛顿反对汇率立法的各股力量似乎的确在逐渐减弱。

Dave Camp, the most senior Republican on the ways and means committee in the House of Representatives, has warned against currency legislation but was finally induced to support the bill when it was rewritten to acknowledge World Trade Organisation rules. Washington insiders say that if the House and Senate both vote for a currency bill by comfortable majorities, it will be politically difficult for the White House to veto.

众议院筹款委员会(ways and means committee)最资深的共和党议员戴维•坎普(Dave Camp)已告诫国会不要对汇率立法,但最终架不住劝说,在法案经修改符合WTO规则后,投下了赞成票。华盛顿内部人士表示,如果参众两院均以绝对多数赞成票通过某项汇率法案,白宫出于政治上的考虑将很难行使否决权。

The other route for the US, apart from applying bilateral diplomatic and legislative pressure on Beijing, has been to try to organise other countries also to make representations to China. But despite concern about the renminbi across much of the world, including other large emerging markets such as India and Brazil, such governments have proved unwilling to challenge Beijing. Washington’s attempts to assemble a coalition of countries willing to support its stance on the renminbi ahead of the Seoul G20 next month has largely failed, at least in terms of those being prepared to come out and criticise China in public.

除了对北京方面展开双边外交、同时施加立法压力,美国另一个手段是设法组织其它国家向中国提出抗议。不过,尽管世界上许多国家都在关注人民币问题,其中包括印度和巴西等其它新兴市场大国,但这些国家的政府并不愿挑战中国政府。华盛顿方面试图在下月G20首尔峰会召开前,召集一众国家支持其人民币立场,但这些努力已基本失败。至少可以说,没有哪个国家愿意站出来公开指责中国。

This year has not been a catastrophic lurch into trade and currency war. But it certainly represents a further heightening of tensions and the moving of heavy legislative ordnance into position. With no armistice obviously in sight, it seems unlikely that this dispute will be come to a rapid and peaceful conclusion.

今年迄今,美中两国还没走到爆发贸易与汇率战争的危险地步。但紧张局势的确有所升级,“重型立法武器”也开始部署到位。在看不到明显“停火”迹象的当下,这场争执似乎不太可能迅速而和平地终结。

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